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Abstract.  Recent writers have asserted that firms controlled by workers are rare because
workers have diverse preferences over firm policies, and thus suffer from high transaction
costs in making collective decisions.  This is contrasted with firms controlled by investors,
who all support the goal of wealth maximization.  However, the source of the asymmetry
between capital and labor has not been clearly identified.  For example, firms could attract
labor inputs by selling transferable shares, and well-known unanimity theorems from the
finance literature carry over to models of this kind.  We resolve this puzzle by arguing that
because financial capital is exceptionally mobile, capital markets are sufficiently competitive
to induce unanimity.  The lower mobility of human capital implies that labor markets are
monopolistically competitive and hence that unanimity cannot be expected in labor-managed
firms.  Moreover, such firms are vulnerable to takeover by investors while capital-managed
firms are substantially less vulnerable to takeover by workers.
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COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND CONTROL RIGHTS IN FIRMS
1.   Introduction
In a Walrasian world of complete and competitive markets, the goal of a commercial
enterprise does not depend on the identities of its decision-makers or the inputs they happen
to supply.  Consumption and production plans are determined independently, and therefore
the agents controlling the enterprise unanimously favor policies that maximize the firm’s net
market value.  This proposition underpins Paul Samuelson’s well-known comment (1957)
that in a competitive economy, it is irrelevant whether capital hires labor or vice versa.
Real market economies are, however, a different matter.  The general pattern is that
control rights within large firms are held by a subset of the firm’s capital suppliers.  Labor-
managed firms (LMFs), which allocate control rights based upon labor supply rather than
capital supply, are rare, and account for less than 1% of total employment in most countries
of North America and Western Europe.  Where LMFs do occur, they are often found in
sectors characterized by small scale, high labor intensity, and limited task differentiation
(Ben-Ner, 1988; Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993; Hansmann, 1996; Dow, 2003).  
One reason for the rarity of LMFs is that such firms sometimes sell out to external
investors and thus become capital-managed firms (KMFs).  Examples can be found among
the plywood cooperatives of the U.S. Northwest (Pencavel, 2002), as well as professional
partnerships in advertising, investment banking, and health care (Hansmann, 1996).  Most
durable LMFs avoid direct democracy and thus limit the capacity of individual members to
shape firm policy.  They also frequently avoid an open market for membership shares.  The
highly successful Mondragon group in Spain is a notable example (Dow, 2003: ch. 3).
   The employees of KMFs seldom enjoy substantial influence over decisions about
product mix, investment in production facilities, research and development, or mergers and
acquisitions.  The spread of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the U.S. does not
alter this assessment.  ESOPs rarely hold a majority of the voting shares in publicly-traded2
firms (Blair, Kruse, and Blasi, 2000), and almost never result in employee representation on
boards of directors (Blasi and Kruse, 1991).   
How can these regularities be explained?  A coherent choice-theoretic account must
start from the fact that markets are incomplete, and that firms offer differentiated bundles of
product attributes, workplace attributes, and state-contingent incomes.  In this context, the
consumption opportunities of stakeholders generally depend on the production decisions of
individual firms.  Accordingly, input suppliers may want firms in which they hold control
rights to pursue goals other than the maximization of net market value.  
To put the same point another way, in a world of incomplete markets any change in
a firm’s production plan typically yields direct consumption effects in addition to the more
familiar wealth effect.  If these consumption effects differ across agents, a collective choice
problem can arise among the decision-makers within the firm.  For example, stakeholders
may disagree over the nature of the firm’s products, the working conditions it provides, the
riskiness of its net income, or the temporal pattern of net income.
    A number of writers have attempted to explain the allocation of enterprise control
rights by appealing to transaction costs associated with collective choice problems in firms.
In particular, Hansmann (1996: chs. 5-6) has argued that higher costs of reaching collective
decisions in LMFs systematically disadvantage these firms relative to KMFs.  In his view,
near-unanimous support among investors for the pursuit of value maximization ensures that
KMFs have lower decision-making costs than LMFs, whose worker-members have more
diverse preferences.  Hence LMFs thrive only where technological conditions such as small
scale or low task differentiation limit the scope for disagreement among workers.  Similar
views have been expressed by Benham and Keefer (1991) and Gordon (1999).
There is a fundamental problem with this argument: standard unanimity theorems
could potentially rule out preference heterogeneity in both KMFs and LMFs.  Makowski
(1983a, b) shows that even with incomplete markets, the consumption effects of firm
decisions vanish, and thus unanimity with respect to value maximization is restored, if all3
agents believe that marginal rates of substitution are unaffected by an individual firm’s
production plan.  Hart (1979a,b) shows that such competitive conjectures are rational when
each firm is small enough relative to the potential market for its shares.  In Hart's model,
consumption effects approach zero as the number of potential share buyers becomes large.
The firm's stakeholders will then unanimously support value-maximizing production plans.
Nothing in the literature indicates why these theoretical results from finance would
not apply to LMFs that attract labor by selling tradeable membership shares.  But if Hart's
argument also applies to labor, there is no basis for the preference heterogeneity stressed by
Hansmann and others.  One cannot use collective choice to explain empirical asymmetries
between KMFs and LMFs without first identifying some asymmetry between the markets
for capital and labor that affects individual preferences over firm policies.  
This insight is the point of departure for our contribution.  We explain the incidence
of firm control rights by a difference in mobility across firms for suppliers of financial and
human capital.  The competitiveness conditions identified by Makowski and Hart can be
approximated only in markets for financial capital.  The inalienable nature of human capital
implies substantial mobility costs for workers and rules out a scenario in which individual
LMFs are vanishingly small relative to the potential market for their ownership shares.  This
asymmetry is reflected in the robustness of modern equity markets as against the rarity and
thinness of markets for membership in LMFs.  
We develop this idea using a two-period stock market model, augmented to allow
simultaneous trade in both capital and labor shares.  This dual markets approach has not
previously been used to study control rights in firms but it is essential in understanding how
asymmetries between KMFs and LMFs can arise despite the apparent formal parallelism of
the relevant asset markets.  The standard conception of asset market equilibrium is then
bolstered by a robustness condition we term sustainability against takeover by outside
coalitions.  This enables us to establish a basic asymmetry: LMFs are prone to takeover by
investor coalitions unless the preference profiles of their members satisfy highly restrictive4
conditions, while KMFs are often sustainable against takeover by worker coalitions.  In
contrast to Hansmann, we do not invoke the transaction costs of collective decision-making.
Our argument bears some relation to that of Dreze and Hagen (1978).  Their main
result (Theorem 1) establishes that the product characteristics chosen by profit-maximizing
firms are Pareto efficient only if one imposes severe restrictions on consumer preferences.
This is consistent with our analysis, but we make the stronger point that even when worker-
controlled firms depart from profit maximization and do achieve Pareto efficient allocations,
they remain prone to takeover by profit-seeking investors.  On the other hand, unanimously
profit-maximizing KMFs that fail to attain Pareto efficiency can nevertheless be sustainable
against worker takeover.  Unlike Dreze and Hagen, we do not take the goals of firm owners
as given, but instead derive them from the underlying structure of capital and labor markets.
The analysis is organized as follows.  In the next section, the model is presented and
conditions ensuring the existence and differentiability of share market equilibria are stated
in Propositions 1 and 2.  The linkage between the competitiveness of share markets and the
nature of shareholder objectives is developed in section 3.  In section 4, we introduce the
notion of sustainability against takeover and contrast the sustainability of KMFs and LMFs.   
Proposition 3 shows that LMFs are prone to investor takeover unless the preference profiles
of their members satisfy conditions virtually as restrictive as unanimity, while Proposition 4
shows that KMFs are sustainable against worker takeover under realistic circumstances.
The final section discusses empirical implications.  The present theory is shown to
account for several stylized facts about the incidence and behavior of LMFs, and to supply a
plausible explanation for employee buyouts of KMFs when these occur.  Proofs of all
propositions are available from the authors upon request.
2. The Model
We modify the standard two-period stock market model, due initially to Diamond
(1967), to include both capital and labor shares.  There are finitely many agents, partitioned
into two classes K and L depending on whether the agent is endowed with capital or labor;5
no one is endowed with both.  We write i ∈ K for capital suppliers and i ∈ L for labor
suppliers.  There is an exogenously given set of firms indexed by f ∈ F.
Endowments
There are two periods, t = 0, 1.  In period t = 0, each i ∈ K has an endowment Ki > 0
of a capital good and each i ∈ L has an endowment Li > 0 of hours.  Each i ∈ K also has an
endowment of (ex ante) capital shares in firms (κi1, κi2, . . κiF) ∈ R+
F with ∑i∈K κif = 1 for
all f ∈ F.  There is a parallel system of ex ante labor shares where each i ∈ L  has the share
endowment (λi1, λi2, . . λiF) ∈ R+
F with  ∑i∈L λif = 1 for all f ∈ F.
Consumption
The consumption of individual i in period 0 is xi0.  Consumption at t = 1 is state-
contingent, with uncertain states indexed by s ∈ S.  Let xis be state-s consumption for agent
i, so i’s consumption plan is xi = (xi0,xi1, . . xiS)  ∈ R+
S+1.  Preferences over consumption
plans are represented by utility functions ui: R+
S+1 → R that are strictly increasing, strictly
quasi-concave, and twice continuously differentiable in R+
S+1 with finite derivatives.
Production
Since there are no endowments of the state-contingent period-1 goods, these goods
must be produced by firms.  Firm f ∈ F produces the output vector yf
1 = (yf1,yf2, . . yfS) ∈
R+
S  in period 1 using capital and labor inputs (kf,lf) acquired in period 0.  The firm’s overall
production plan is denoted by yf = (kf,lf,yf
1) ∈ R+
S+2.  Input requirements are given by kf = lf
= gf(yf
1)/2 where gf: R+
S  → R+ is increasing and continuously differentiable with gf(0) = 0.
Whenever kf or lf is finite the set of feasible output vectors yf
1 is bounded.
Policies
   The fraction of output distributed to firm f’s labor suppliers as a group (in every
state) is μf ∈ [0,1], with 1-μf paid out to capital suppliers.  We refer to φf = (yf
1,μf) as the
policy of firm f and denote the vector of firms’ policies by φ.
Markets6
Markets operate only in period 0.  All agents secure claims on period-1 goods via
shares in firms.  There are two types of output claims, both associated with the supply of an
input: capital shares κif indicating capital supplier i’s claim on firm f, and labor shares λif
indicating labor supplier i’s claim on the same firm.  We call κif and λif ex post shares to
distinguish them from the ex ante share endowments κif and λif.  We also use κi0 and λi0 to
denote period-0 consumption.  The resulting portfolios are κi = (κi0, κi1. . κiF) ∈ R+
F+1 and
λi = (λi0, λi1 . . λiF) ∈ R+
F+1 with κ = {κi}i∈K and λ = {λi}i∈L. 
Portfolios induce consumption bundles according to the following mapping.
(1a) xi0 = κi0 and
xis  = ∑f ∈F κif(1-μf)yfs for all s ∈ S and i ∈ K;
(1b) xi0 = λi0 and
xis  = ∑f∈F λifμfyfs for all s ∈ S and i ∈ L.
In our framework shares reflect commitments to supply inputs as well as claims on
the resulting output.  If firm f has the total capital requirement kf = gf(yf
1)/2 then purchasing
the capital share κif entails an obligation to supply κifgf(yf
1)/2 units of capital to firm f, and
likewise purchasing the labor share λif entails an obligation to supply λifgf(yf
1)/2 units of
labor.  It is therefore natural to rule out short sales.  This feature of the model leads to a
physical restriction on feasible portfolios because it must be possible to comply with all
input supply obligations simultaneously.  Thus portfolios need to satisfy
(2a) ∑f∈F κifgf(yf
1)/2 ≤ Ki all i ∈ K
(2b) ∑f∈F λifgf(yf
1)/2 ≤ Li all i ∈ L
For simplicity, we assume that any physical endowment not supplied to firms is converted
into the period-0 consumption good on a one-for-one basis.  We define consumption sets7
(relative to fixed firm policies φ) by Ωi
K = {κi ≥ 0: ∑f κifgf/2 ≤ Ki} for all i ∈ K and Ωi
L =
{λi ≥ 0: ∑f λifgf/2 ≤ Li} for all i ∈ L.  
Agents can sell off their ex ante shares in firms (κif or λif) in exchange for period-0
consumption.  The price of a capital share in firm f is pf and the price of a labor share is qf.
The price of the period-0 consumption good is p0 ≡ q0.  The price vectors facing agents are
p = (p0,p1 . . pF) ∈ R+
F+1 and q = (q0,q1 . . qF) ∈ R+
F+1 for K and L respectively.  The budget
constraints for the two types of agents are given by
(3a) pκi  ≤  Wi
K(p,q)  ≡  p0Ki + ∑f∈F (1-μf)κifvf for all i ∈ K and
(3b) qλi  ≤  Wi
L(p,q)  ≡  q0Li + ∑f∈F μfλifvf for all i ∈ L
where vf ≡ pf + qf – p0gf(yf
1) is the net market value of firm f and μf is defined below.
To see how these constraints arise, first consider a firm f organized solely by some
individual investor i ∈ K.  This investor can obtain pf – p0gf/2 by selling off the firm’s ex
ante capital shares, where pf is the price of the pure financial claim on period-1 consumption
associated with firm f’s capital shares and p0gf/2 is the cost of satisfying the firm’s capital
requirements, expressed as foregone period-0 consumption.  Although the ex post owner of
a capital share must supply capital inputs to the firm, the resulting loss in consumption is
borne by the ex ante owner through the price of capital shares.  If the ex ante owner keeps
some or all capital shares and personally supplies this input, again the opportunity cost falls
on the ex ante owner.  For this reason it is convenient to define prices so that the cost of
firm f’s capital input is deducted from the value of the ex ante owner’s endowment in (3a).
By virtue of organizing the firm, investor i is also endowed with the firm’s ex ante
labor shares.  Because i ∈ K has no endowment of this input, firm f can only obtain labor if
these shares are sold to one or more workers.  The investor receives qf – q0gf/2 through such
transactions, where qf is the price paid for the period-1 consumption claim associated with a
labor share and q0gf/2 is foregone period-0 consumption resulting from the ex post owner’s
supply obligation.  Again, the cost of labor supplied to firm f falls ultimately on the ex ante8
owner even though this agent does not personally provide any of this input, and share prices
are defined so that this cost is deducted from the value of the ex ante owner’s endowment.  
The founder of the firm thus captures the overall net market value vf from the sale of
ex ante capital and labor shares.  The set of feasible portfolios is unaffected by whether the
founder supplies inputs directly or sells shares to other agents who take on this role.  When
i ∈ K is the sole founder, we set μf = 0 and κif = 1 in (3), with κjf = 0 for all j ∈ K such that
j ≠ i.  The analysis is symmetric when some individual worker i ∈ L is the sole founder of
firm f.  In that case we set μf = 1 and λif = 1 in (3), with λjf = 0 for all j ∈ L such that j ≠ i.
More generally, firm f could be organized by a coalition consisting of some capital
suppliers and some labor suppliers.  The net market value vf is then divided by its founders
through a bargaining process we do not model here.  Let μf be the fraction of net firm value
vf captured by labor suppliers as a group and let 1-μf be the fraction captured by capital
suppliers as a group, where (1-μf)κif is the share of vf obtained by an individual investor i ∈
K and μfλif is the share obtained by an individual worker i ∈ L.  Assigning the ex ante
capital shares in proportion to κif and the ex ante labor shares in proportion to λif implies
that the generalized ownership shares (1-μf)κif and μfλif in (3) reflect the bargaining power
of the agents with respect to the entrepreneurial rent generated by firm f.
From (2) and (3) the budget sets for each type of agent are
Bi
K(p,q) ≡ {κi ∈ Ωi
K: pκi ≤ Wi
K(p,q)}
Bi
L(p,q) ≡  {λi ∈ Ωi
L: qλi ≤ Wi
L(p,q)}
Define κi0 ≡ K i - ∑f (1-μf)κifgf(yf
1) and λi0
 ≡ Li - ∑f μfλifgf(yf
1), which can be regarded as
physical endowments net of agent i’s endowed share in the cost of each firm’s production
plan.  We impose two restrictions on the production plans (yf) of firms.
Ex ante feasibility (EAF):     κi0  > 0 for all i ∈ K and  λi0 > 0 for all i ∈ L
Ex post feasibility (EPF):     ∑f∈F gf(yf
1)/2 < ∑i∈K Ki and ∑f∈F gf(yf
1)/2 < ∑i∈L Li9
EAF says that each agent can cover her ex ante share in firm costs by liquidating part of her
input endowment.  Because the price vectors p and q are non-negative, this ensures that each
consumer has positive wealth in (3a) and (3b).  EPF ensures that total endowments are large
enough to implement all production plans simultaneously.
Time Sequence
Agents with ex ante control rights in each firm establish a tentative policy for that
firm.  If there is a takeover market, coalitions lacking control rights in a given firm can now
bid to acquire such rights.  If there is no takeover market or no bid is accepted, the original
policies stand, but otherwise they are modified according to the terms of successful bids.
After policies are fixed, markets for capital and labor shares open and inputs are supplied in
proportion to ex post shares. Production takes place in period 1.  Finally, the realized state-
contingent outputs are divided as specified by firm policies and the ex post share allocation.
For given policies φ let Ui(κi) be the utility function induced over κi for i ∈ K by
(1a).  Similarly let Ui(λi) be the utility function induced for i ∈ L by (1b).
A share market equilibrium relative to fixed policies φ is a set of portfolios (κ*,λ*) and a
non-negative price vector (p,q) ≠ 0 (with p0 ≡ q0) having the following properties.
Optimization
E1a For each i ∈ K, κi* maximizes Ui(κi) subject to κi ∈ Bi
K(p,q)
E1b For each i ∈ L, λi* maximizes Ui(λi) subject to λi ∈ Bi
L(p,q)
Market clearing
E2a ∑i∈K κi0* + ∑i∈L λi0* =  ∑i∈K Ki  +  ∑i∈L Li -  ∑f∈F gf
E2b For each f ∈ F, ∑i∈K κif* = 1 
E2c For each f ∈ F, ∑i∈L λif* = 1 
Proposition 1. Fix any firm policies φ satisfying EAF and EPF. A share market equilibrium
exists relative to φ.10
Proposition 2.  Suppose there is a share market equilibrium with the following properties.
(a) All shares are non-null: that is, 0 < μf < 1 and yf
1 ≠ 0 for all f ∈ F.
(b) The output vectors {yf
1} for f ∈ F are linearly independent.
(c) For each i ∈ K and i ∈ L there is a neighborhood around current prices and policies
in which the set of binding constraints on portfolio choice does not change.
(d) The Jacobian matrix resulting from differentiation of the aggregate excess demands
for shares is non-singular at the equilibrium.
Then in a neighborhood of the current policies φ, the share prices (p,q) are continuously
differentiable functions of firm policies.
Assumption (a) ensures that all prices are strictly positive, while (b) guarantees that
optimal portfolios are unique for given prices and policies.  This implies that the number of
firms cannot exceed the number of states; linear independence of output vectors is a generic
feature of firm policies in this situation.  Assumption (c) avoids the problem that arbitrarily
small changes in parameters could move an agent from zero to positive shareholdings in a
firm or vice versa.  Along with a standard strengthening of strict quasi-concavity to ensure
the sufficiency rather than just the necessity of second order conditions, this implies that the
portfolios are continuously differentiable in prices and policies.  Finally, (d) permits the use
of the implicit function theorem.  Assumptions (c) and (d) can be regarded as the ‘typical’
case, but a formal genericity proof is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Market Structure and Policy Preferences
As discussed in the introduction, differences in mobility costs lead to differences in
the structures of the capital and labor markets.  The market for each firm’s capital shares is
competitive because an investor encounters no cost in shifting financial capital across firms,
and an individual firm is negligible relative to the economy as a whole.  Thus no single firm
can alter the implicit prices of state-contingent consumption for investors.  However, each11
firm is significant in the market for its own labor shares due to costly worker mobility, and
its policies can affect the prices for period-1 consumption that implicitly confront workers
participating in this market.  We generally picture labor markets as geographically localized,
but the operative notion of ‘distance’ could also reflect costly search or mismatches in skill.
It will frequently be necessary in what follows to consider the preferences of agents
toward local policy changes in some firm f.  Given fixed policies for all other firms, the
maximized utility of i ∈ K as a function of the policy φf can be written
(4a) Ti(φf) = Ui[κi*(φf);φf] + ηi*(φf)[Ki - g(φf)κi*(φf)/2]
          + θi*(φf)[Wi
K(p(φf),q(φf),φf) - p(φf)κi*(φf)]
where Ui is the utility function over capital shares induced by equation (1a); κi*(φf) is an
optimal portfolio in the share market equilibrium associated with policy φf; ηi* is the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier for the physical input constraint in (2a), with g = (g0,g1 . . gF) and g0 ≡ 0;
and θi* is the multiplier for the budget constraint defined by (3a).  Multipliers for the non-
negativity constraints on capital shares can be ignored by assumption (c) of Proposition 2.
Due to the structure of the budget constraint, firm f’s policy influences agent i’s wealth Wi
K
only through the net values vh(φf) = ph(φf)+ qh(φf) - gh(φf) for h ∈ F rather than the prices ph
and qh separately, where we have now set p0 ≡ q0 ≡ 1.  The counterpart to (4a) for i ∈ L is
(4b) Ti(φf) = Ui[λi*(φf);φf] + ηi*(φf)[Li - g(φf)λi*(φf)/2]
          + θi*(φf)[Wi
L(p(φf),q(φf),φf) - q(φf)λi*(φf)]
The effects on the utility of an agent i ∈ K of changing firm f’s policy variables yfs
and μf are given respectively by  
(5a) ∂Ti/∂yfs = θi*(1-μf)κif (∂vf/∂yfs) + θi*∑h≠f (1-μh)κih(∂vh/∂yfs)
          + κif*[(1-μf)uis - ηi*(∂gf/∂yfs)/2 - θi*(∂pf/∂yfs)] - θi*∑h≠f κih*(∂ph/∂yfs)12
(6a) ∂Ti/∂μf = θi*(1-μf)κif (∂vf/∂μf ) + θi*∑h≠f (1-μh)κih(∂vh/∂μf)
          - κif*[∑s uisyfs + θi*(∂pf/∂μf)] - θi*∑h≠f κih*(∂ph/∂μf)
where uis is the partial derivative of the utility function ui with respect to consumption xis in
state s.  The first line in each of equations (5a) and (6a) is the wealth effect, which we split
into a direct effect involving firm f’s own net value vf and an indirect effect involving the
values of other firms.  The second line in each of (5a) and (6a) is the consumption effect,
which again has direct and indirect components.  The consumption effect captures changes
in utility resulting from changes in the implicit prices of state-contingent output.
The corresponding derivatives for i ∈ L are
(5b) ∂Ti/∂yfs = θi*μfλif(∂vf/∂yfs) + θi*∑h≠f μhλih(∂vh/∂yfs)
+ λif*[μfuis - ηi*(∂gf/∂yfs)/2 - θi*(∂qf/∂yfs)] - θi*∑h≠f λih*(∂qh/∂yfs)
(6b) ∂Ti/∂μf = θi*μfλif (∂vf/∂μf ) + θi*∑h≠f μhλih(∂vh/∂μf)
+ λif*[∑s uisyfs - θi*(∂qf/∂μf)] - θi*∑h≠f λih*(∂qh/∂μf)
where again in each equation the first line represents the wealth effect and the second line
represents the consumption effect from a given policy change.
Now consider a local policy change dφf = (dyf1 . . dyfS, dμf).  The change in firm f’s
net market value resulting from dφf is dvf = ∑s (∂vf/∂yfs)dyfs + (∂vf/∂μf)dμf.  The effect on
agent i’s utility is given by dTi = θi*dwif + dzif where θi*dwif is the overall wealth effect
from dφf and dzif is the consumption effect.  Notice that the change in wealth dwif includes
both the direct effect from dvf and indirect effects operating through dvh for h ≠ f.  
We next state our key assumption.
CC: Markets for capital shares are perfectly competitive in the sense of Hart (1979a,b)
and Makowski (1983a,b) while markets for labor shares are not.13
CC implies that the consumption effect of firm f’s policy on investor i’s utility in (5a) and
(6a) is zero, so all investors evaluate policy changes in firm f solely by their wealth effects.
But workers will generally differ both with respect to the sign of the consumption effect dzif
from a local policy change dφf and the relative size of the consumption and wealth effects.
We assume that scale economies rule out an assignment of workers such that all workers in
each firm have identical tastes (otherwise, no collective choice issue arises for the LMF).
To justify our claim that capital share markets are perfectly competitive, we need to
link our model with Hart (1979a). The assumptions used by Hart are either implied by our
framework or consistent with it, but due to space limitations we will not delve into technical
details.  Instead, we take a more intuitive approach.  
Interpret the model in section 2 as describing a geographic region containing finitely
many capital suppliers, labor suppliers, and firms.  Suppose there are R identical regions of
this kind.  Capital moves freely across regions, but workers can supply labor only to firms
in their region.  Suppose for the moment that all regions are ‘capitalist’: that is, all firms are
KMFs with μf = 0 for all f so workers have no ex ante claim on the net market value of any
firm.  The prices of labor shares (qf) for firms in a particular region are determined solely
by the policies of the firms in that region, the preferences of the local workers, and the time
endowments of these workers.  The policies of firms in other regions are irrelevant because
local workers cannot supply labor to such firms and worker wealth is unaffected by capital
share prices.  Fix the policies of all firms.
Now interpret each i ∈ K from section 2 as a ‘type’ of investor in Hart’s sense,
implying that all investors of a given type have identical preferences and wealth.  Regions
are replicated by increasing R.  As R goes to infinity, each firm becomes negligible relative
to the aggregate capital market because its output is constrained by the finite labor
endowment of its own region.  In the limit economy no firm can influence the implicit prices
of state-contingent output facing investors, and capital share prices are determined by14
(7) pf(φf) = maxi∈K* {Σs∈S zis(xi)(1-μf)yfs}
where zis(xi) ≡ uis(xi)/ui0(xi) is investor i’s marginal rate of substitution between state s and
period 0, and the maximization is over the set K*  of investor types whose consumption
bundles xi have positive measure in the limit economy defined by Hart (1979a).  Each
type’s bundle xi is independent of any individual firm’s policy φf because each firm is small
and can affect the consumption of only finitely many investors. Some implications of this
pricing formula are developed by Makowski (1983a,b) and Makowski and Pepall (1985).
Against this backdrop we add a new region where some firms are LMFs with μf > 0.
This captures the empirical reality that the LMF sector is small relative to the aggregate
economy, which is dominated by capitalist firms.  Although LMFs may have some ability to
affect the implicit prices facing workers in a local labor market, they must attract investors
who have access to a perfectly competitive capital market.  The policies of firms in the LMF
region have a negligible effect on the capital market as a whole so the pricing formula for
capital shares given by (7) applies to this region as well.
The prices in (7) are well-defined but could be non-differentiable.  This is true at the
policy φf only if Σs∈S zis(xi)(1-μf)yfs = Σs∈S zjs(xj)(1-μf)yfs for two distinct investor types i ≠ j,
implying Σs∈S Δzs(1-μf)yfs = 0 where Δzs ≡ zis - zjs.  The output vector (1-μf)yf
1 for capital
suppliers as a group is therefore orthogonal to Δz ≠ 0 and lies in a subspace of dimension
S-1. If there are finitely many investor types there are only finitely many such subspaces,
and pf is differentiable at almost all φf.  We assume this in the rest of the paper.
4. Takeover Bids and Sustainability
Suppose now that before share markets open, the ex ante shareholders of firms can
be bought out by alternative coalitions who will implement policies differing from those of
the initial owners.  We will show that the asymmetric structure of capital and labor markets
discussed in section 3 affects the survival properties of KMFs  and LMFs in asymmetric
ways.  In particular, LMFs are prone to takeover by wealth-maximizing investors except15
under highly restrictive conditions, while KMFs are sustainable against takeover by worker
coalitions under conditions that seem likely to be met in practice.  
Let the controlling group Cf for firm f be the set of agents entitled to vote on firm
f’s policies.  A necessary condition for membership in Cf is that an agent have a positive ex
ante stake in the firm, that is, (1-μf)κif > 0 for i ∈ K or μfλif > 0 for i ∈ L.  Voting rights may
be confined to a proper subset of the ex ante shareholders.  A firm is defined to be a KMF
if Cf ⊆ K and all i with κif > 0 have a vote.  Likewise an LMF has Cf ⊆ L and all i with λif >
0 have a vote.  In each case, votes are proportional to the endowments κif or λif.  It is natural
to suppose that KMFs have μf = 0 and LMFs have μf = 1 (agents without voting rights also
lack ex ante claims on the firm’s net market value), but this is not essential.
A majority rule equilibrium in the sense of Plott (1967) is defined as follows.  The
policy φf* is a majority rule equilibrium in firm f if for any local deviation dφf there is some
majority coalition M ⊆ Cf such that no i ∈ M is strictly better off when dφf is implemented.
A majority coalition is a subset M ⊆ Cf having 50% or more of the total votes in firm f.  A
deviation dφf from the status quo can be blocked by any such M if all members of M vote
against it.  Each i ⊆ Cf votes against dφf unless this deviation strictly increases her utility.
The concept of majority rule equilibrium has previously been applied to collective choice in
firms by Sadanand and Williamson (1991) and deMarzo (1993).
An equilibrium of this sort does not generally exist when voters have heterogeneous
preferences and the policy space has high dimensionality.  Kramer (1973) has shown that
the restrictions on preference profiles needed to guarantee majority-rule transitivity do not
differ significantly from the condition of identical preferences.  Further, McKelvey (1979)
demonstrates that when majority rule intransitivity obtains, it may be extreme, in the sense
that majority decisions can cycle over virtually all alternatives in the relevant choice set.
For our purposes it is unimportant how status quo policies are determined, because
all we need below is the generic non-existence of majority rule equilibrium in LMFs (for a
discussion of policy equilibrium in a related context, see Magill and Quinzii, 1996: ch. 6).16
Thus we simply assume the existence of some collective choice procedure that defines a
tentative policy φf for each f ∈ F.  In order to stress that transaction costs of the Hansmann
sort are not essential to our story, we further suppose that this choice procedure costlessly
picks a policy that is Pareto efficient relative to the preferences of the controlling group Cf,
given the policies of all other firms.  This biases the analysis in favor of LMF viability, and
hence strengthens our conclusions about the vulnerability of such firms to takeover bids.
Now let a market for control rights open in period 0 after tentative policy decisions
have been made but before these policies are finalized.  Transactions on this market involve
takeovers, which occur when a bidding coalition purchases a majority of the shares owned
by the ex ante controlling group.  After the takeover market closes the policies proposed by
successful takeover coalitions are adopted, and tentative policies become final otherwise.
Let Bf be a coalition seeking to take over firm f, where Bf ∩ Cf = ∅.  A controlling
group Cf is sustainable only if there are no gains from trade between the outsider group Bf
and any strict voting majority M of the insider group Cf (for related ideas see Hart, 1977).
A takeover bid for firm f consists of a firm valuation vf′ at which Bf offers to buy all ex ante
shares held by a particular strict majority M, together with a local policy change dφf that Bf
promises to adopt if it gains control.  All members of M must expect (vf′,dφf) to increase
their utilities for the bid to succeed.  Each member of Bf contributes a positive fraction of the
payment to M and acquires a corresponding claim on the firm’s new market value.
Formally, the controlling group Cf is sustainable against takeover by Bf when there
is no feasible bid (vf′,dφf) such that
T1: All i ∈ M ⊆ Cf for some strict majority M of the controlling group Cf increase their
utility by selling their ex ante shares at price vf′ when dφf is implemented; and
T2: All i ∈ Bf increase their utility by acquiring the ex ante shares of M at price vf′ when
dφf is implemented.17
If the coalition Bf can commit itself to arbitrary policy changes, whether contractually or by
reputation, then dφf is unrestricted.  Otherwise dφf must be confined to a subset of credible
proposals.  Since we are interested only in local changes, and takeover bids are formulated
by coalitions rather than individuals, the usual notion of subgame perfection is difficult to
apply.  An approach that is similar in spirit is to require that dφf make all members of Bf
strictly better off once this coalition takes control.  Thus when commitment is impossible,
the proposal dφf is said to be credible if dTi > 0 for all i ∈ Bf where dTi is the change in
utility induced by dφf after Bf has acquired control and the side payment vf′ is sunk.
Proposition 3 (sustainability of LMFs).
Consider an LMF and any takeover coalition Bf ⊆ K consisting entirely of investors
with a zero ex ante capital share for all firms in the LMF’s labor market.
(a) Suppose takeover coalitions can commit themselves to arbitrary policy changes. The
controlling group Cf ⊆ L is sustainable against takeover by Bf if and only if its
tentative policy φf* is a majority rule equilibrium.
(b) Suppose takeover coalitions cannot commit themselves to arbitrary policy changes
and bids must therefore be credible.  The controlling group Cf ⊆ L is sustainable
against takeover by Bf if and only if there is no policy change dφf that induces dvf >
0 and makes some strict majority M ⊆ Cf better off.
Proposition 3(a) says that if commitment to policy changes is feasible, an LMF with
individually tradeable shares will be taken over by outside investors unless it has achieved a
majority rule equilibrium.  But we know from the discussion earlier in this section that this
is very unlikely.  Such an equilibrium can only arise if a share-weighted majority of worker-
members has essentially identical preferences toward the firm’s policies.  The problem for
the LMF is that some frustrated majority is generally willing to bribe a coalition of outside
investors to implement a new policy.18
The prospects for LMF viability are less bleak when outside investors can credibly
commit only to policy changes that increase the market value of the firm.  Proposition 3(b)
says that in this case an LMF is sustainable as long as there is no way to increase firm value
that would be supported by a majority of the current worker-members.  A fortiori, the firm
is sustainable if it is already maximizing its market value.  But takeover bids that target non-
value-maximizing LMFs will also fail as long as any policy change that wealth-maximizing
investors can credibly deliver would be opposed by some majority of the firm’s insiders.
Proposition 4 (sustainability of KMFs).
Consider a KMF that adopts a tentative policy φf* which maximizes its market value
vf.  Assume each investor i ∈ Cf  has a zero ex ante capital share for all other firms in the
same labor market as firm f.  The following results hold whether or not a takeover coalition
Bf can commit to arbitrary policy changes.
(a) The controlling group Cf ⊆ K is sustainable against takeover by any coalition Bf that
includes an outside investor i ∈ K who has a zero ex ante capital share for all firms
in the same labor market as firm f.
(b) The controlling group Cf ⊆ K is sustainable against a worker coalition Bf ⊆ L if and
only if for every local policy change dφf there is some i ∈ Bf whose utility does not
increase when dφf is adopted.
The first message of Proposition 4 is that a capitalist firm generally faces a threat of
takeover only from worker coalitions.  Because KMFs are already value-maximizing, there
are no gains from trade between inside and outside investors.  The only caveat is that the
firm could be vulnerable to a takeover coalition consisting entirely of investors with ex ante
claims on firms h ≠ f operating in the same local labor market.  Such investors may want to
implement policies that decrease one firm’s value in order to increase the value of another
firm.  The assumptions of Proposition 4 rule out such indirect wealth effects.19
Worker teams could nevertheless take over a KMF in order to pursue consumption
goals at the expense of value maximization.  For a worker buyout to succeed, the takeover
coalition must unanimously agree on the desirability of some local policy shift.  If it does,
commitment issues are irrelevant because the change is automatically credible.  In principle
a single employee with a sufficiently large endowment could always buy out a KMF for
consumption purposes, since one-person coalitions never have internal disagreements.  But
a realistic view of worker wealth and credit markets suggests that labor coalitions must be
sizable in order to take over large firms.  We will return to this point in section 5.
Proposition 4 does not require that workers participating in a takeover bid intend to
work in the firm ex post (λif* > 0).  It might appear that only employees of firm f could
obtain consumption benefits by changing its policy so viable takeover coalitions could only
emerge from within this subset of workers.  This is not correct because the consumption
effects in (5b) and (6b) include terms involving the prices of labor shares for other firms,
which could be non-zero even though λif* = 0.  In a monopolistically competitive labor
market, a worker who does not supply labor to firm f might want to change its policies in
order to change the price of labor shares at some firm h ≠ f where she does plan to work.  
This complication clearly cannot arise for monopsony (one firm per labor market),
since then λif* = 0 implies a zero consumption effect.  Even without monopsony, though, a
KMF will generally be open to takeover only by its own employees because workers will
seldom find it attractive to buy a firm that does not employ them merely to influence prices
elsewhere in the local labor market.
5. Conclusion
Several factors not captured in our formal analysis tend to reduce the likelihood of a
worker takeover beyond what is described in Proposition 4.  First,  small employee groups
with parallel consumption interests may encounter liquidity problems in buying out capital-
intensive KMFs, while larger coalitions that could potentially overcome such problems may20
be unable to agree on firm policies.  Second, when unanimity cannot be achieved, coalition
size is likely to matter due to transaction costs of the sort emphasized by Hansmann (1996).
Again, this makes it less likely that a large employee coalition could take over a KMF, but
has no effect on investors who want to take over an LMF.  Finally, collective bargaining is
often a good substitute for control rights from the standpoint of KMF employees who want
to pursue consumption goals within the firm, as long as the consumption benefits involved
can be specified and enforced contractually.  But there is no real alternative to takeover for
investors who would like to profit by reorganizing a LMF in a wealth-enhancing direction.
The theory developed here is consistent with numerous stylized facts about labor-
managed firms.  Foremost among these is the emphasis LMFs commonly give to achieving
homogeneity among members with respect to rewards, skills, attitudes, and organizational
roles (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986: 95-100).  Our analysis also accounts for the tendency of
LMFs to cluster in craft manufacturing and professional services such as law and medicine.
The small scale of such firms helps facilitate bargaining and informal side payments among
workers, while a uniform occupation may promote homogeneity of attitudes and beliefs.  It
is probably also not a coincidence that workers' cooperatives often demand conformity to
religious or ideological principles, recruit from particular ethnic groups, or have a cohesive
group of founders who share a common vision of the firm’s objectives.
These regularities are also consistent with the transaction cost approach of Benham
and Keefer (1991) and Hansmann (1996).  However, in contrast to these writers we have
shown that LMFs concerned with organizational stability will limit preference heterogeneity
even if the cost of collective decision-making is zero.  Another contrast involves credibility.
In our model, LMFs are generically unstable if investors can make binding commitments
about firm policies, but may become stable if investors can credibly promise only wealth-
increasing deviations.  This prediction does not emerge from the transaction cost approach.
Most fundamentally, we derive asymmetries in preferences from the differing structures of
capital and labor markets.  These asymmetries are left unexplained in the existing literature.21
Our theory does not assert that KMFs will never be taken over by their employees,
but it highlights the need for a uniform motivation within the takeover coalition.  From this
perspective it is interesting that employee buyouts tend to occur disproportionately often in
KMFs facing financial difficulties (Dow, 2003: ch. 10).  The prospect of a plant closing or
bankruptcy likely affects many employees in a parallel way, and thus gives rise to takeover
coalitions that might lack cohesion at other times.  The fact that employee buyouts are more
common in troughs of the business cycle (Ben-Ner and Jun, 1996) is consistent with the
notion that collective bargaining is a poor substitute for takeover when liquidation is likely.  
Our theory also highlights a tension between the organizational stability of the LMF
and reliance on individually tradeable membership rights.  Rare as LMFs are, markets for
LMF membership are much rarer.  This is true despite theoretical arguments favoring such
markets (Sertel, 1982; Dow, 1986, 1996).  One possible explanation is that if LMFs want to
avoid takeover bids, they may find it attractive to prohibit internal majorities from selling
their voting rights.  In practice this is likely to mean banning the sale of membership rights
entirely, since otherwise an outside investor could gain control through a series of bilateral
bargains with individual members (see Dow, 2003: ch. 7 for a further discussion).
Worker participation in decision-making has well-documented benefits, especially
when it is accompanied by participation in financial results (Doucouliagos, 1995; Ben-Ner,
Han, and Jones, 1996).  There have also been remarkably successful experiments with full
workers' control, including many cooperatives in Italy, France, and Spain (Bonin, Jones, and
Putterman, 1993; Dow, 2003: chs. 3-4).  But these success stories generally involve muted
or indirect forms of worker participation.  In our view a serious program for worker control
of firms must reconcile democratic participation with organizational stability.  The advocates
of such programs thus need to address collective choice problems explicitly.22
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